ON THE PERILS OF INADEQUATE ANALOGIES
DAN TAMMUZ 1

ABSTRACT
Linking law is barely a decade old. Over the course of this
short period, a wide variety of approaches have come to light. In
fact, different jurisdictions have come to different conclusions
regarding similar issues. Recently, there has been a new addition
to the jurisprudence. A Texas holding established that linking to
copyright-protected content violates copyright. This iBrief argues
that the reasoning in this decision is flawed. The opposite
conclusion should have been reached by applying straightforward
copyright analysis and by looking to recent case law regarding
hyperlinking.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
SFX Motor Sports (“SFX”) has been promoting professional
Supercross racing events for over 20 years. 2 Supercross is “a competitive
motorcycle racing event conducted at indoor stadiums in which contestants
compete over a man-made dirt track that contains various jumps, bumps and
hairpin turns.” 3 As part of SFX’s promotional efforts, the company
produces live audio webcasts, which it makes available on its website. 4

Robert Davis 5 ran SupercrossLIVE.com. 6 Davis provided “chat,
statistical datas [sic], audio webcasts, video webcasts, and software
solutions, offering enthusiasts and fans a web community via various sports
centric Internet sites.” 7 SupercrossLIVE.com, founded in 2003, was one of
¶2

1

J.D. candidate at Duke University School of Law, 2008; B.A. in Economics,
Johns Hopkins University, 2001.
2
First Amended Complaint at 3, Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 306-CV-276-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2196 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007)
[hereinafter Complaint].
3
Id.
4
Id. at 5. SFX’s website is accessible at http://www.supercross.cc.com.
5
Davis is a pro se defendant.
6
Defendant’s and Counter Claimant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Response to
Defendant’s and Counter Claimant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Live
Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3-06-CV-276-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2196 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Response to Motion for Summary
Judgment].
7
Id.
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these sites. 8 Among other content, Davis posted hyperlinks to SFX’s audio
webcasts on SupercrossLIVE. 9
¶3
On February 13, 2006, SFX Motor Sports (“SFX”) filed a
complaint alleging four counts against Robert Davis. 10 Three counts
pertained to trademark infringement and unfair competition due to improper
trademark use. 11 The fourth count alleged copyright infringement. 12 The
defendants counterclaimed, alleging trademark infringement. 13

SFX’s trademark allegations concerned the use of its logos on the
SupercrossLIVE.com website. 14 Davis’ trademark claim revolved around
SFX’s use of the phrase “Supercross Live” on its website—a phrase
allegedly infringing on his claimed trademark of SupercrossLIVE. 15
¶4

¶5
This iBrief will focus on a portion of the copyright infringement
claim. SFX asserted that Davis “willfully copied, reproduced and
distributed, and continue[s] to copy, reproduce and distribute SFX’s Audio
Web Casts . . . at Defendants’ web site, www.supercrosslive.com . . . .” 16
¶6
On January 9, 2007, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas ruled on the matter. 17 Judge Sam A. Lindsay
held that Davis “violated SFX’s copyright by providing a link of its
webcasts without authorization, and not for a protected ‘fair use’ purpose
under the Copyright Act.” 18 The analysis in the opinion can be said to be
cursory at best. 19
It makes only passing reference to existing
jurisprudence. 20 In fact, Judge Lindsay relies almost exclusively on an
analogy to a case involving “unauthorized satellite transmissions of the

8

Id.
Id. at 3.
10
Complaint, supra note 2 (The defendants specified are Robert Davis doing
business as Tripleclamps and www.supercrosslive.com. Plaintiff in this case is
Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. formerly known as SFX Motor Sports, Inc.).
11
Id. at 7–11.
12
Id. at 12.
13
Answer to Complaint Denying Allegation of Trademark Infringement with
Counterclaims at 7–8, Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3-06-CV276-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2196 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007) [hereinafter
Answer to Complaint].
14
Complaint, supra note 2, at 6.
15
Answer to Complaint, supra note 13, at 7-8.
16
Complaint, supra note 2, at 12.
17
Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3-06-CV-276-L, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2196 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007).
18
Id. at *14.
19
Id. at *6–14.
20
Id.
9
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National Football League’s (“NFL”) copyrighted weekly live broadcasts of
football games to viewers in Canada.” 21
¶7
The first part of this iBrief scrutinizes the facts of the case in order
to pinpoint the exact issue. Part II examines Live Nation Motor Sports v.
Davis 22 using the bare copyright framework implemented by the holding.
Part III analyzes the issue in the framework of existing case law pertaining
to the legality of linking to content.

I. WHAT HAPPENED?
¶8
Each party presents the relevant facts differently. In order to
proceed with the analysis, it is important to be familiar with the parties’
presentations of the matter and to disentangle the underlying facts.
¶9
SFX presents its understanding of the matter in paragraph 43 of the
First Amended Complaint: “Initially, without the knowledge, and always
without authorization or consent, of SFX, Defendants have willfully copied,
reproduced and distributed, and continue to copy, reproduce and distribute
SFX’s Audio Web Casts . . . at Defendants’ web site,
www.supercrosslive.com even after receipt of written notice of their
infringing activities.” 23
¶10

Davis’ portrayal differs significantly:
Plaintiff is absolutely wrong in asserting that Defendant has ever
rebroadcast copyright work [sic]. Defendant provides Internet visitors
to SupercrossLIVE.com with a hyperlink, which launches the visitor’s
user-defined media player, initiating the audio feed directly from the
source to the visitor’s media player, independent of Defendants’
website. A hyperlink is the most common and basic element of the
Internet and can be thought of as a pointer. A pointer specifies for the
user’s computer, the destination file or web page to be displayed on
user’s computer. This is material in fact. 24

¶11
Davis adds that he “did NOT and does NOT copy NOR reproduce
Plaintiffs [sic] audio webcast original material, it is the same audio webcast
link freely distributed by ClearChannel [the company from which Live

21

Id. at *11 (referring to National Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint
Venture, 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000)) (emphasis added).
22
Id.
23
Complaint, supra note 2, at 12.
24
Defendants and Counter Claimants’ Brief in Support of Response to
Plaintiffs’ Brief in Support of Response to Defendants and Counter Claimants
Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis,
No. 3-06-CV-276-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2196 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007)
[hereinafter Supporting Brief].
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Nation was spun off] executives and thousands of individuals upon
thousands of websites worldwide.” 25
¶12
Judge Lindsay, in an attempt to harmonize the diverging accounts,
sees things in a different light. 26 He equates Davis’ admission of having a
link on his website 27 with the streaming 28 of SFX’s “live webcast of
[supercross] races on his website [Davis’ website] in ‘real time,’ . . . .”
(emphasis added). 29
¶13
Indeed, the logical gap that Judge Lindsay skipped in his attempt to
reconcile the parties’ differing positions is the crux of this copyright
infringement claim. If Davis copied the copyright-protected webcasts onto
his website, then he would most likely be guilty of copyright infringement.
However, the question is whether Davis would have been equally guilty for
merely having provided a link to the copyright-protected content.
¶14
Instead of focusing on this question, the opinion endeavors to
support its unlikely harmonization attempt by pointing out semantic
inconsistencies in the defense. 30 The discrepancy stems from two
statements in two separate documents. On the one hand, Defendants
submitted a document stating that they “FLATLY DENY that they have
ever had any involvement with a ‘Process Known as Streaming.’” 31 On the
other hand, a previous document states that “TripleClamps [one of the
defendants] . . . provides leading edge streaming technologies to millions of
live audiences around the world for many of USA’s and Europe’s Major
Amateur and Pro Events in Motocross, Arenacross, [and] Supercross . . .
.” 32

25

Defendant’s and Counter Claimant’s Motion to Quash Plaintiffs Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and to Quash Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and to Quash Plaintiff’s Proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusion of
Law in support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 1, Live Nation Motor
Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3-06-CV-276-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2196 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Motion to Quash].
26
Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3:06-CV-276-L, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2196, at *6–7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007).
27
Id. at *7.
28
See Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 489 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The
Internet . . . [is] a viable medium over which to transmit, in real time, sound
recordings. This real-time transmission of sound recordings over the Internet is
known as ‘streaming’ and ‘webcasting’ . . . .”).
29
Id. at *6.
30
Id. at *10 n.4.
31
Motion to Quash, supra note 25, at 2.
32
Answer to Complaint Denying Allegation of Trademark Infringement with
Counterclaims, at 6, Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3-06-CV-276L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2196 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007).
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Judge Lindsay points out that we are faced with two irreconcilable
statements made by the same party. 33 However, they do not both
necessarily pertain to this case.
Were we to assume that
SupercrossLIVE.com does indeed stream content, it would not require the
conclusion that this content includes SFX’s copyright-protected webcasts.
Indeed, SupercrossLIVE.com could lawfully stream a host of content—its
own, or that which it has licensed from others.
¶15

¶16
Having dealt with the red herring that is the streaming matter, the
remaining analysis is much cleaner. Davis had either copied the content to
his website or he had not. As was stated, had he copied it, he would have
been liable for copyright infringement without a doubt. Therefore,
consistent with Davis’ Motion to Quash, this iBrief will proceed under the
assumption that a link to SFX’s copyright-protected content was posted on
Davis’ website.

II. COPYRIGHT ANALYSIS
Live Nation Motor Sports attempts to analyze the infringement
using a standard two part test: 34 “the plaintiff [must] show ‘ownership’ of
the material and ‘copying’ by the defendant.” 35
¶17

¶18
The first prong of the test, ownership, was thoroughly investigated
in the holding. 36 Questions were raised regarding the timing of the
copyright protection; 37 the concern being that because the webcasts are
broadcast live, they may not be registered immediately. 38 The plaintiff
introduced documents that satisfied the court on this matter, 39 leading it to
hold that SFX was in fact the copyright holder and thus the owner of the
webcasts. 40
¶19
While SFX satisfies the ownership requirement of the test, it is less
than certain that SupercrossLIVE.com engaged in copying the material.
Under the working assumption, Davis merely posted a link to SFX’s
webcasts; he did not copy them. 41

33

Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3-06-CV-276-L, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2196, at *10 n.4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007).
34
Id. at *7.
35
Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th Cir. 1991).
36
Live Nation, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2196, at *9.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
See supra Part I.
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Judge Lindsay attempts to draw an analogy between the instant case
and National Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture (“NFL”). 42
The facts of the cases, however, differ too significantly to draw a helpful
analogy. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture (“PrimeTime”) is “a satellite carrier
that makes secondary transmissions of copyrighted television networking to
owners and renters of satellite dish antennae.” 43 This activity was done
pursuant to a statutorily granted license. 44 However, in addition to
retransmitting to the class of people specified by the license, PrimeTime
also made such secondary transmissions “to its satellite subscribers in
Canada.” 45 PrimeTime was found to have infringed on the NFL’s
copyright. 46
¶20

¶21
Judge Lindsay follows the NFL opinion and determines without
further explanation that “the unauthorized ‘link’ to the live webcasts that
Davis provides on his website qualifies as a copied display or performance
of SFX’s copyrightable material.” 47 While the reasoning in NFL may be
flawless, it is completely inapplicable to the instant case due to the extreme
divergence of the fact patterns.
¶22
The two cases are not in the least bit comparable. The National
Football League owned copyrights to the content in question. 48 PrimeTime
engaged in capturing the signal and retransmitting it. 49 The Copyright Act
has been found to encompass capturing a signal as a public display or
performance. 50 Displaying a work means showing a copy of it. 51 This
would involve copying the material. Thus, the two-part infringement test
was satisfied—ownership and copying have been demonstrated.
¶23
Had SupercrossLIVE undisputedly copied the protected content
onto its servers and then let the public stream the webcasts from them, a
copy would have been made, the second prong of the test would have been
satisfied and the cases would thus be analogous. The facts in Live Nation
do not support such a conclusion. SupercrossLIVE.com did not capture the

42

Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3-06-CV-276-L, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2196, at *11–12 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007) (analogizing to Nat’l Football
League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000)).
43
Nat’l Football League, 211 F.3d at 11.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 12.
47
Live Nation, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2196, at *12 (analogizing to Nat’l
Football League, 211 F.3d at 10).
48
Nat’l Football League, 211 F.3d at 11.
49
Id. at 12–13.
50
Id. at 12.
51
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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webcasts, but merely provided links to webcasts hosted by SFX. 52 An
analogy of this would be PrimeTime notifying its viewers of the channel
they should turn to in order to watch National Football League content.
Since Lindsay’s NFL analogy should not stand,
SupercrossLIVE.com cannot be said to have engaged in copying protected
material. If the second prong of the infringement test is not satisfied, the
claim cannot stand.
¶24

III. LINKING JURISPRUDENCE
In Live Nation Motor Sports v. Davis 53 Judge Lindsay found it
necessary to rely on NFL, a case having nothing to do with linking, but
rather entirely about retransmission. 54 This should not have been the case.
There already exists nearly a decade’s worth of linking jurisprudence. 55
Granted, different areas have reached different conclusions, but such case
law at least provides a framework with which to analyze these emerging
issues. This would have been true, of course, had the issue (linking) been
properly confined initially, without the analysis veering into neighboring
matters that did not pertain to the litigation (streaming). 56
¶25

¶26
Not all holdings are relevant. Indeed, they vary from state to state,
and markedly from country to country. In addition to being unsettled,
linking cases also highlight the differences in approaches to copyright
protection between Europe and the United States.
¶27
An exceptional illustration of this is a recent holding issued by the
Belgian Court of the First Instance in Copiepresse v. Google, Inc. 57 The
court ruled that “Google had infringed the copyright of Belgian newspapers
by publishing links to their stories on Google News.” 58 The court found
that because of Google News’ presentation of news articles from Belgian
sources, references made to the publisher, copyright protection and the
reproduction permission were not evident. 59 Much of the analysis was
based on an expansive interpretation of Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. 60 The court held for the plaintiffs and

52

Supporting Brief, supra note 24, at 2.
No. 3-06-CV-276-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2196 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007).
54
Id.
55
See infra note 65 (a 1996 case on linking).
56
See supra Part I.
57
Copiepresse v. Google, Inc., No. 06/10.928/C (Feb. 2, 2007).
58
The World This Week: Business, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 2007, at 9.
59
Id.
60
European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5
(“The exercise of these freedoms . . . may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in
53
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ordered that Google not include their publications in Google News. 61 The
two parties have since resolved their issues. 62 This very protective holding
has taken the opposite attitude of cases built on similar situations that have
been brought forward in the United States. 63
¶28
This part of the iBrief will review some of the recent landmark
holdings in the area of linking (“linking law”). It will asses their relevance
to a proper in-depth analysis of the Live Nation Motor Sports case and apply
them. The first subpart surveys the seminal cases in linking law,
highlighting the different approaches taken early on. Subpart B emphasizes
case law regarding deep-linking, 64 which is the issue at hand in Live Nation
Motor Sports. The third subpart looks at the case in light of this
jurisprudence.

A. The Cross-Continental Origins of Linking Law
Linking law jurisprudence began with Shetland Times v. Wills. 65
The Shetland News (“the News”) and the Shetland Times (“the Times”)
each ran a website with their articles. 66 In the event that the Times ran a
story that the News was not covering, the latter would provide a hyperlink
to the former’s story. 67 This practice triggered the lawsuit. 68 While part of
the judgment was based on the copyright protection of the Times’ article
titles, which were displayed along with the hyperlink on the News’
website, 69 Lord Hamilton’s reasoning is an interesting gauge of public
opinion and perception of the Internet in 1996:
¶29

It was fundamental to the setting up by the pursuers of their web site
that access to their material should be gained only by accessing their
web directly. . . . There was, in the circumstances, no substance, in my
view, in the suggestion that the pursuers were gaining an advantage by
their newspaper items being made available more readily through the
defenders’ web site. 70

a democratic society . . . for the protection of the reputation or the rights of
others . . . .”).
61
Copiepresse, No. 06/10.928/C.
62
Press Release, Google and Copiepresse. Joint Press Release (May 3, 2007)
available at http://www.copiepresse.be/cpgoogleanglais.pdf.
63
See supra Part II.A–B.
64
See supra Part II.B. (defining “deep-link”).
65
Shetland Times v. Wills, 1997 S.C. 316, 317–18 (Sess. 1996).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 318.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 319.
70
Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
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An interim interdict (similar to a preliminary injunction) was issued
and the two parties ultimately settled the case, permitting the News to link
to articles in the Times so long as the latter was identified as the “originator
of the linked stories.” 71
¶30

A holding often cited as a parallel to Shetland Times 72 in the United
States was reached some seven years later in the pivotal case, Kelly v.
Arriba Soft. 73 Arriba Soft was a search engine designed to find images
using search words. 74 Arriba Soft downloaded graphics. 75 It then scaled
them down in order to create thumbnails, proceeding to delete the original
images. 76 After clicking on one of these thumbnails, which were shown
after a search, the original image was displayed using in-line linking, 77
surrounded by information about it. 78 The court used a four-factor analysis
to determine that this practice was justified by fair use. 79
¶31

Kelly v. Arriba Soft has been read by some as very permissive. 80 A
commentator notes that “[t]he decision wisely permits use of the content
indexes and links that are typically used and needed in Internet searching
and navigation.” 81

¶32

Perfect 10 v. Google 82 is a more recent case based on similar facts.
Perfect 10 is an adult magazine, which also operates a subscription website
featuring its copyrighted images. 83 Google operates a search engine for
¶33

71

Shetland Times v. Wills, 1997 S.C. 316, 320 (Sess. 1996).
Id.
73
336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
74
Kelly v. Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
“[An] in-line link instructs the user’s browser to retrieve the linked-to image
from the source website and display it on the user’s screen, but does so without
leaving the linking document.” Id. at 816(emphasis added) (referring to Stacey
L. Dogan, Infringement Once Removed: The Perils of Hyper-Linking to
Infringing Content, 87 IOWA L. REV. 829, 839 n.32 (2002)).
78
Kelly, 336 F.3d at 815–16.
79
Id. at 817–22. The court looked to the fair use factors specified in the
Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006)): (1) the purpose and character of the
use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and sustainability
of the portion used; (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
80
Mark Sableman, Link Law Revisited: Internet Linking Law at Five Years, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1273, 1290 (2001).
81
Id.
82
416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (D. Cal., 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
83
Id. at 831–32.
72
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images, similar to Arriba Soft’s. 84 Clicking on a thumbnail loads a page
with the upper frame 85 being Google’s and the lower frame being the
“original web page on which the original image was found.” 86
One of the claims raised was that by in-line linking to the original
website, Google violated the copyright-holders’ exclusive right to display
their content. 87 The court implemented two tests to analyze this issue: the
server test and the incorporation test. 88

¶34

The server test defines “display” as “the act of serving content over
the web—i.e., physically sending ones and zeroes over the internet to the
user’s browser.” 89 The incorporation test defines “display” as “the mere act
of incorporating content into a webpage that is then pulled up by the
browser.” 90 While deliberating, the court acknowledged that applying
either test could lead to exploitation. 91 The court finally embraced the
server test, which was proposed by Google. 92 Its reasoning in adopting this
method was quite convincing: This test mirrors what happens on the
technological level as people are liable solely for content on their servers; it
protects search engines that may link to infringing material, since the search
engines themselves do not house the material; it is easily applicable, as one
looks merely to where the information is stored; the websites posting
copyright-infringing material remain liable; and it is in harmony with the
objectives of the copyright law, by “encouraging the dissemination of
information,” since it does not induce any reticence to linking. 93
¶35

This reasoning, with respect to the in-line linking of images was
affirmed when the case was recently appealed. 94
¶36

B. Deep-Linking
¶37
Having established something of a background of linking
jurisprudence, this subpart focuses on the specific type of linking involved
84

Id. at 841.
Sableman, supra note 80, at 560 (explaining framing as allowing “the operator
of a website to divide a browser window into multiple, independently scrollable
frames with different layouts, and to place separate documents, from different
Internet sources, in each window”).
86
Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833–34 (D. Cal., 2006).
87
Id. at 838. See supra note 77 (defining “in-line link”).
88
Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 839–40.
89
Id. at 839.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 839–43.
92
Id. at 843.
93
Id. at 843–44.
94
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 715–19, 733–34 (9th Cir.
2007).
85
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in Live Nation Motor Sports. v. Davis. This type of practice is called “deep
linking.” Commentator Mark Sableman lays a solid foundation for
understanding the concept:
Most websites have a central “home” page to which all subsidiary
pages are linked. Website publishers probably expect users to visit
their site through this home page “front door,” and to move around the
website using the website’s own links to subsidiary pages. With this
expectation, many websites post introductory material—possibly
including third-party paid advertisements, and special teasers and
highlights relating to their own site—on that home page. . . . [A]nyone
who reaches a subsidiary page may record the URL of that page and
use it as a hyperlink, thus enabling others to by pass the website’s front
door and go to the subsidiary page of interest. Such links are known
as “deep linking” because they link directly to subsidiary page “deep”
within a website. 95

This explanation mirrors the facts of the Live Nation Motor Sports
case. Davis posted a link on SupercrossLIVE.com to the webcasts, which
were subsidiary pages on the SFX website. 96 This being the case, SFX is
suing Davis in order to prevent him from engaging in deep-linking.

¶38

Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc. 97 is a case that directly
involves deep-linking. Ticketmaster operates a website supplying basic
information about events as well as the option of purchasing tickets to them
directly through its services. 98 Tickets.com provides information about
events, but does not necessarily sell tickets to them. 99 Because
Ticketmaster has exclusive agreements with the events it carries,
Tickets.com is not able to sell tickets for them. 100 In such cases,
Tickets.com posts information about the event as well as a deep-link to an
interior page on the Ticketmaster site where tickets can be purchased. 101
¶39

¶40
The court concluded that hyperlinking is not a violation of the
Copyright Act. 102 Initially, the opinion analogized copying event
information and posting a hyperlink to the selling webpage to “taking
historical facts from a work of reference and printing them in different
expression.” 103 Judge Hupp continued the opinion, stating in no uncertain
terms, that deep-linking is not a copyright violation since “no copying is
95

Sableman, supra note 80 at 1291.
Supporting Brief, supra note 24, at 2.
97
No. CV 99-7654, 2000 WL 525390 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
98
Id. at *1.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at *2.
103
Ticketmaster, No. CV 99-7654, 2000 WL 525390 at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
96
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involved.” 104 This statement was strengthened by a further analogy to the
use of a library card index, which references items for fast and efficient
access. 105
In addition to the copyright infringement claim, Ticketmaster
also raised a breach of contract claim. 106 While this does not pertain
directly to the Live Nation Motor Sports analysis, it reflects the court’s
attitude toward the entire matter. Ticketmaster noted among its terms
and conditions that deep-linking was not permitted. 107 The court decided
not to enforce these terms. 108
¶41

C. Reviewing Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis
Tim Berners-Lee, the man who developed the World Wide Web, 109
provides an interesting viewpoint. He maintains that “free linking lies at the
heart of the Internet.” 110 Indeed, one of the prevailing theories behind
Internet links is that they “serve an organizational and beneficial
purpose.” 111 The present case illustrates this perception. Davis’ website
was a source of information for Supercross fans. 112 It is only natural that he
should supply them with suggestions of other places to access the
information that he could not provide on his own.
¶42

¶43
Part II followed through a straightforward copyright infringement
analysis of the case. 113 It established that SupercrossLIVE.com’s link to
SFX’s webcasts did not infringe on the latter’s copyright. 114 This finding is
supported by tracing through the jurisprudence discussed in Part III, while
keeping in mind the facts of Live Nation Motor Sports.

A good starting point would look to Perfect 10. 115
SupercrossLIVE.com did not incorporate the material in its website. 116 This

¶44

104

Id.
Id.
106
Id. at *3.
107
Id.
108
The reasoning behind the court’s decision was that there was no need to
click, signifying agreement with them, and they were displayed in a location
where the customer had to scroll down in order to find them. Id.
109
Michael J. Santorelli, Rationalizing the Municipal Broadband Debate, 3
INFO. SOC. J. OF LAW & POL. 43, 51 n.33 (2007).
110
Sableman, supra note 80, at 1275.
111
Michael Dockins, Comment: Internet Links: The Good, the Bad, the
Tortious, and a Two-Part Test, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 367, 367 (2005).
112
See supra ¶2.
113
See supra Part II.
114
Id.
115
Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006). See
discussion supra Part II.A.
105
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would be a clear violation of SFX’s exclusive rights stemming from its
copyright on the content. Using the server test, the link directs visitors’
browsers to SFX’s site, where the content is accessed. 117
Also, Kelly v. Arriba Soft was read to be permissive of links
facilitating Internet navigation. 118 Davis describes SupercrossLIVE.com as
providing Supercross “enthusiasts and fans a web community via various
sports centric Internet sites.” 119
¶45

¶46
Looking specifically to the deep-linking issue raised in Live Nation
Motor Sports begs drawing an analogy to Ticketmaster v. Tickets.com. 120 In
the latter case, Judge Hupp asserted that deep-linking is not a copyright
violation. 121 Furthermore, he likened the practice to facilitating reference,
the way a library card index does. 122 Hyperlinks have repeatedly been
considered as nothing more than a referencing tool. 123 Indeed, what could
be more innocent and less infringing?

CONCLUSION
¶47
Judge Lindsay admits that “[l]itigation over copyright protections
for live internet webcasts has not made its way into controlling Fifth Circuit
opinions.” 124 This being the case, further investigation into existing
jurisprudence on linking law in other jurisdictions should have made.
Given the existing holdings regarding linking law, there was no reason to
force the facts at hand into a badly fitting analogy constructed on the basis
of a case dealing with satellite retransmission to Canada. 125
¶48
Finally, however, the parties reached a settlement, pursuant to
which a final consent judgment was issued on May 30, 2007.126 Two weeks
later, Davis’ domain name was registered by Live Nation. 127

116

See Supporting Brief, supra note 24, at 2.
Id.
118
Sableman, supra note 80, at 1290 (commenting on 335 F.3d 811 (9th Cir.
2003)).
119
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 6, at 2.
120
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV 99-7654, 2000 WL 525390
(C.D. Cal. 2000). See discussion supra Part II.B.
121
Id. at *2.
122
Id.
123
Dockins, supra note 111, at 382.
124
Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3-06-CV-276-L, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2196, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007).
125
Id. at *11–12 (citing National Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint
Venture, 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000)).
126
Final Consent Judgment, Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3-06CV-276-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2196 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007).
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As revealed by a whois search on supercrossLIVE.com on Aug. 31, 2007.

